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ABSTRACT
The current pattern of sudden stops and financial crises in emerging markets has great resonance to
events in the first era of globalization, from 1870-1913. In this paper I present descriptive statistics
on capital flows, current account reversals and financial crises during the period 1870-1913 and
compare them with the recent experience. I analyze the incidence of crises and measure their effects
on real output losses. Furthermore, I consider the influence of openness to trade, original sin and
currency mismatches on the pattern of sudden stops and financial crises. I find strikingly similar
patterns  across  both  eras  of  globalization.  The  pre-1914  sudden  stops  were  associated  with
significant output losses comparable with the recent events, and their effects differed considerably
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          Introduction 
 
The pattern of sudden stops in capital flows to emerging market countries in the 
1990s and early 2000s has great resonance to events in the first era of globalization 
between 1880-1914, especially the events in the late 1880s and early 1890s. In those 
years many emerging countries were beset by a drastic decline in capital flows from the 
core countries of Western Europe and many of these countries suffered currency, banking 
and debt crises evoking a strong sense of déjà vu. 
 
 This paper describes a pattern of events that seem uncommonly modern including 
external shocks coming from a tightening of monetary policy in the core, a rise in 
sovereign yield spreads, a drying up of capital flows, a current account reversal, a decline 
in nominal exchange rates in countries with paper currencies, a decline in real output and 
a spate of financial crises. Although capital flows decline in virtually every country in 
this period, the impact on the real economy and the incidence of crises differed markedly. 
These differences reflected similar factors to those stressed today: differences in 
structure, exposure to shocks, institutions and policies. Especially important in that era 
was the prevalence of “original sin” –most countries had much of their external and 
internal debt denominated in terms of gold or sterling. This opened them up to the risk of 
balance sheet induced financial stress and possibly crises, a phenomenon resonant to the 
role of liability dollarization today. Whether this happened or not was related to the 
presence of strong institutions and sound policy, what Caballero, Cowen and Kearns 
(2004) refer to as country and currency trust. 
 
Section 2 tells the story of   sudden stops and their impact on the economy. It also 
considers the role of original sin and currency mismatch in fomenting or aggravating 
financial crises.  Section 3 presents some facts on the incidence of sudden stops, current 
account reversals and other types of crises in emerging market countries and compares it 
to the recent experience. I also portray evidence on capital flows, and  on sovereign bond 
spreads  and then measure the impact of sudden stops and other crisis events on real 
growth. Section 4 considers the influence of original sin and of currency mismatches on 
the pattern of financial crises. Section 5 concludes with some policy lessons from the 
experience of sudden stops in the first era of globalization. 
 
 
2. The story today 
 
Guillermo Calvo and his associates ( Calvo , Izquierdo, and Meija 2004,  Calvo and 
Talvi, 2005, Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi 2005 and 2006) have presented a convincing case 
for the importance of systemic sudden stops  as the key cause of the  pattern of  severe 
financial turbulence in emerging countries in recent decades. The template for their 
analysis is the fallout from the Russian debt default in August 1998. That external shock 
ended a protracted period of capital flows from the US and other advanced countries to 
the emerging markets. This reflected the opening up of capital markets following the   3 
1989 Brady plan which resolved the 1980s debt crisis, and the high tech boom in US 
asset markets then led to burgeoning flows in the middle of the decade.  
 
The crisis triggered a cutback in lending and a sharp rise in spreads ( see figure 1 ). The 
contagion Calvo and Talvi (2004) posit likely came via the common creditor channel 
whereby the  balance sheets of highly leveraged investors in emerging markets  were 
negatively impacted by losses from the Russian default leading to a liquidity crunch and a 
general” sell off of EM bonds across the board at fire sale prices to meet margin calls” 
(Calvo and Talvi, 2004  p 9). The reduction in portfolio capital flows affected a wide 
variety of borrowers including advanced countries like Australia and New Zealand. 
(figure 2) . The shock led to current account reversals in many countries (figure 3) a 
depreciation in nominal and real exchange rates (figure 4) and a decline in growth rates 
of real GDP, generally brought about by a collapse in investment (figure 5). Recovery is 





Source: Calvo et al (2004)
Figure 1
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Source: Calvo et al (2006)
Figure 2
Source: Calvo et al (2004)
Figure 3  5 
Nominal and Real Exchange Rates
Source: Calvo et al (2006)
Figure 4




In some cases the sudden shock was associated with a financial crisis , prominent 
examples include, Brazil 1998, Argentina 2001 and Turkey 2001. How hard countries are   6 
hit by the virus depends on economic structure, especially the degree of openness. Calvo 
and Talvi (2004) demonstrate how a depreciating real exchange rate requires a greater 
compression by the non traded goods sector in the case of a relatively closed economy 
like Argentina compared to Chile. It also depends on the extent of liability dollarization 
which can seriously impact the balance sheets of firms and especially the banking sector 
when exchange rate depreciation increases the value of liabilities relative to local 
currency assets. This can contribute to a banking crisis as the collateral backing bank 
loans deteriorates. It can also lead to a debt crisis for governments whose debts are in 
dollars and whose tax revenues to service the debt are in local currency. Both the banking 
and debt crises can generate currency crises as international reserves which serve to back 
the banking system’s liabilities as well as the government’s balance sheet are threatened ( 
Dooley 2000, Mishkin 2003). 
 
The Argentine crisis of 2001 incorporated many of these elements ( Calvo et al 2005). By 
contrast, Chile which  was both more open  and whose economy was much less 
dollarized experienced a serious current account correction and slowdown in growth but 
no crisis ( Calvo and Talvi 2004). In sharp contrast to both Latin American countries , 
however ,Australia’s experience following the 1998 crisis was much more benign. Like 
Chile, Australia experienced an adverse terms of trade shock and decline in demand for 
her exports. In response, the Australian Reserve Bank  reduced interest rates and allowed  
the Australian dollar to depreciate by 15% thereby insulating the Australian economy 
from the external shock. Moreover Australia was able to rely on foreign borrowing to 
smooth the adjustment (Caballero et al 2004). The Chilean central bank fearful of the 
consequences of depreciation on balance sheets as well as of capital flight ( fear of 
floating), tightened monetary policy and thereby aggravated the real consequences of the 
sudden shock. According to Caballero et al ( 2004), Australia had both  “country trust”--- 
confidence by investors in the underlying soundness of its institutions and “currency 
trust”—confidence in its commitment to a credible nominal anchor. These attributes 
allowed Australia to ride out the financial turbulence which even Chile, the most 
successful Latin American emerging market economy lacked. As we will see below these 
factors were also at work in the emerging market crises of a century ago. 
 
3. Evidence on Sudden stops, financial crises and real growth from an earlier era of 
globalization. 
 
A strikingly similar pattern of external shock driven sudden stops, current account 
reversals, financial crises and collapses in growth rates is evident for the emerging 
countries in the first era of globalization. In this section I present some descriptive 
statistics to highlight this phenomenon. It is based on data from my financial crises 
databases with Barry Eichengreen ( Bordo , Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez Peria 
2001)and with Chris Meissner( Bordo and Meissner 2005). In a recent paper Luis Catao( 
2005) identified sudden stops in capital flows in 12 emerging countries  from 1870 -1914. 
He measured sudden stops in a way similar to that used by Calvo and others. He defines a 
sudden stop “as a drop from peak to trough of no less than 2 standard deviations of 
respective series from a linear trend and or any drop that exceeds 3% over a period 
shorter than 4 years.” He times the beginning of an SS as the year when capital inflows   7 
peak and the end when when capital flows renew relative to trend without dropping back 
to its lowest level( relative to trend) within a 4 year period. ( Catao 2005 page 7.) 
 
Using data on net capital flows and gross capital flows from London to the emerging 
countries he identifies three episodes of sudden stops hitting many countries: in the mid 
1870s, in the early 1890s and in 1906-07. These three episodes are also years which 
Kindleberger( 1996) , Bordo ( 1986) and others have demarcated as international 
financial crises. In that vein figure 6 shows the incidence of various types of crises events 
1880-1914 using the data from Bordo-Eichengreen and Bordo-Meissner. We demarcate 
sudden stops, currency crises, banking crises , and debt crises. We also show current 
account reversals which are not financial crises but are often accompanied by them.
1 The 
dates for the reversals comes from Eichengreen and Adelet (2005). We restrict ourselves 
to 12 countries with sudden stops in net capital flows in Catao’s sample (Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy , Norway, Spain, Sweden and 
the United States).
2 As can be seen from the figure there were frequent SSs as well as 
crises and from figure 6 we also see that the incidence of all of the types of events are 
bunched in the period from the mid 1880s through the 90s and also in the first decade of 
the twentieth century.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Current account reversals can often be benign reflecting intertemporal consumption smoothing. Millesi-
Ferretti and Razin ( 2000), Edwards ( 2003) and Adelet and Eichengreen ( 2005) find that most reversals 
are benign. 
2 Following Bordo and Eichengreen we treat the US as an emerging country although in most respects it 
was an advanced country with the principal exception that it was a net recipient of capital inflows until the 
turn of the  twentieth century  and it had  a relatively unstable banking system .Catao ( 2005) has 4 other 
countries in his sample (Greece, New Zealand, Portugal and Russia) which did not exhibit sudden stops in 
net capital flows but did exhibit them in gross flows.   8 
 
Incidence of Different Types of Crises 1880-1913
Number of Crises
Years
  Banking Crisis
  Currency Crisis
  Debt Crisis
  CA Reversal
  Sudden Stop
(Including country names)
The sample includes: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United States 
Source:Bordo & Meissner (2005), Catao (2006), Eichengreen & Adalet (2005)
Figure 6
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Figure 7 shows the frequency of the different types of events extending the template of 
Bordo-et al ( 2001) to include sudden stops and  current account reversals. We define 
frequency as the number of years a country was in crisis divided by the total possible 
years of observation. As can be seen, the probability of a sudden stop was the highest of 
all events in the pre 1914 period at 7%, the probability of a current account reversal was a 
bit less at 6.1%. Crises were rarer events than sudden stops with banking crises being the 
most likely at 4.8% followed by currency crises at 3.5% and debt crises at 1%.
3 By 
comparison we also show the frequency of various kinds of crises in the present era of 
globalization 1980 – 2004. The sudden stop chronology for 18 countries is from Calvo et 
al (2006) Appendix Table 2. The crisis chronologies come from Bordo and Meissner 
(2005) Appendix 1. The frequency of sudden stops is very similar in the two periods 
whereas the other crises are of much greater frequency in the recent period than in the 
past. 
                                                 
3  Bordo and Meissner ( 2006a) using a larger sample of 30 countries find a fairly similar pattern for the 
three traditional types of crises. The probability of a banking crisis was 3.8%, of a currency crisis 2.2% and 
of a debt crisis 1%. The lower incidence for banking and currency crises reflects the fact that the larger data 
sample has many more advanced countries in it which had stable banking systems, sound fiscs and strictly 






















Sudden Stops (1) CA Reversals (2) Banking Crises Currency Crisis Debt Crises
1880-1913
1980-2004*
Frequency of Different Types of Crises 1880-1913
Type of Event
* For Ca Reversals, and Financial Crises only from 1980-1997
Note:  Percent probability per year = number of years in crisis divided by total possible years of observation (both numerator and denominator exclude years of ongoing crisis
Sample for 1880-1913: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United States
Sample for 1980-2004: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire, Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, 
Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela 

































 The sudden stop episodes can be seen in figures 8 and 9 which show the average patterns 
of net capital flows 1880-1914  and also gross capital flows based on Stone’s ( 1990) 
capital calls on London data. (Appendix figures 1 and 2 present the individual country 
series.) The gross capital flows clearly show the pattern of significant runups in capital 
inflows in the 1880s and then a sharp drop in the 1890s. Net flows show this pattern for a 
number of countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy Denmark and Australia.   10 
Net Capital Flows to Emerging Countries 1880-1913
Year
































Gross Capital Flows to Emerging Countries 1880-1914
Year



































 Figure 10 shows the average pattern of sovereign bond spreads 1880-1914. (The 
individual country data is in Appendix Figure 3). Figure 10 also shows a declining trend 
line which picks up the well known phenomenon that spreads declined steadily from   11 
1870 to 1900 reflecting financial market integration ( Bordo and Rockoff 1996). As in the 
case of capital flows, spreads increase dramatically in the late 1880s through the mid 90s 
for  a number of  countries experiencing sudden stops, especially those which 
experienced debt crises including Argentina and Italy . 
 






































Figure 11 shows the pattern of nominal exchange rates for countries which did not adhere 
(or partially adhered) to the gold standard. A number of these countries experienced 
depreciating rates which may have been an ingredient in weakening their balance sheet 
leading to debt crises, eg the Latin countries and Spain. 
 
   12 
Nominal Exchange Rates  for Non-Gold Countries 
1880-1913
Year






















































 Figure 12 shows the pattern of real exchange rates in countries which did not 
continuously adhere to the gold standard. Several countries experience a depreciation 
pattern similar to that shown in figure 4. There was not much movement in real exchange 
rates during sudden stop episodes for the gold standard countries.   13 






























Real E = nominal E (local $/ sterling) x (Price index England/ Price Index Local). Price indexes with base 1913.
























Finally we examine the behavior of real output associated with sudden stops. Following 
the approach taken in the contemporary literature we measure the change in the growth 
rates comparing the three year average leading up to the event to the three years 
afterwards.
4 Appendix figure 4 shows the pattern of real GDP per capita with sudden stop 
episodes shaded for each of 12 countries. . The incidence of financial crises during the 
sudden stop is also indicated. The evidence is summarized in figure 13  which shows the 
losses by year and figure 14 which shows the losses by country. 
 
                                                 




























Output Losses during Sudden Stops 1880-1913























-Output loss = average growth rate three years before the crisis – average growth rate 3 years after the crisis 
-Australia 1903 case excluded 















































(average change in growth rates)
Figure 14
Notes: 
-Output loss = average growth rate three years before the crisis – average growth rate 3 years after the crisis 
-Australia 1903 case excluded 
Sources:  Catao (2006) and Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, Martinez-Peria, (2001) 
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 Table 1 compares the output losses under sudden stops with those in sudden stops 
accompanied by financial crises. The facts are dramatic . SSs associated with crises 
produced ten times greater collapses in growth than those which not associated with 
crises. By comparison, in the recent period sudden stops with financial crises produced 
twelve times greater output losses than those without. Also the percentage of sudden 
stops with crises was twice as high as in the earlier era. This suggests that the sudden stop 
problem today is considerably worse than pre 1914.  
 















% of Sudden 
Stops during 
period
(1) If there is a financial crisis (Banking, Currency or Debt Crisis) within 4 years of the start of the Sudden Stop
(2) Crisis Data available only until 1997
Output loss = average growth rate three years before the crisis – average growth rate 3 years after the crisis 
Sample for 1880-1913: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United States
Sample for 1980-2004: Argetnina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire, Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Phillipines, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uruguay and Venezuela 






















All in all, the data show that sudden stops pre 1914 were associated with significant  
output losses comparable to  very recent patterns and that some countries were very hard 
hit , especially in the late 1880s and early 90s. Notable among these cases were 




4. Sudden Stops in the 1890s. 
 
The episode from the first era of globalization with the most resonance for today was the 
big lending boom in the 1880s by the core countries of Europe to the peripheral countries 
in the New World which ended abruptly in 1889-90. The boom occurred in a period of 
depressed economic conditions in England and the other European countries when low 
interest rates and sluggish investment made the higher rates of return in the Americas and 
Australasia very attractive. The boom ended as the European economy recovered at the 
end of the decade and investment opportunities reappeared. In the face of rising aggregate   16 
demand the Bank of England raised its discount rate from 2 ½ to 6% . This was matched 
by the German Reichsbank and other central banks ( see figure 15). This policy shock 
precipitated a massive slowdown in investment abroad (see figures 8 and 9). 
 
 






























(1) Shaded are years in which a Sudden Stop started for one of the countries in the sample: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and the United States 































The effects on the peripheral countries of this sudden stop differed considerably 
depending on their economic circumstances (structure), their institutions and the policies 
followed. Three classic examples of countries hard hit by sudden stops were Argentina, 
Brazil and Australia. Their story contains many elements familiar to observers today. 
 
Argentina in the 1880s enjoyed a massive development boom. British capital flooded in 
to develop the infrastructure of the interior and Buenos Aires. At the same time 1 million 
immigrants flooded in from Europe. The boom followed a period of political 
consolidation which gave power to the Federal government after decades of civil strife 
between it and the Province of Buenos Aires as well as the creation of sound political 
institutions. These political changes created a sense of optimism for overseas investors ( 
Adalet and Eichengreen 2005). 
 
 Much of the investment went to finance railroads and other infrastructure. The provincial 
governments  also engaged in significant  bond financed fiscal expenditure. The boom 
was partially fueled by bank credit manifested in   large paper money issues in a period 
when the country was off the gold standard (Della Paolera and Taylor 2004).  
    17 
Once the core countries  tightened credit it became more difficult to place new issues and 
to service the debt. The failure of the investment house of Barings to place the issue of 
the Buenos Aires Water Supply and Drainage Company led to its insolvency in 1890. A 
banking crisis was averted in London by a rescue operation engineered by the Bank of 
England.  In Argentina the stop in foreign investment following the Baring crisis led to a 
banking crisis as well as a debt crisis and a currency crisis. The debt crisis in which the 
Argentine government suspended interest payments on its debt was resolved in a workout 
arranged by Lord Rothschild in which the government secured a bridge loan from its 
London bankers  sufficient to cover its interest obligations for 3 years . The Argentine 
economy contracted by 4% in 1890 and then by 11% in 1891. After that it rebounded 
quickly. 
 
 Liability dollarization was a factor in the crisis as a significant fraction of Argentine debt 
was denominated in sterling. In addition the issue of gold backed provincial mortgage 
bonds( the cedulas in 1889), backfired as an attempt to convince foreign investors of the 
soundness of their investment when the peso depreciated increasing the gold obligations 
of the government ( Bordo and Meissner 2006 b) 
 
 Brazil in the 1880s also attracted overseas investment to develop its infrastructure. The 
boom was aided by the emancipation of the slaves in 1888 and the end of the monarchy 
in 1889. Like the case of Argentina, fiscal deficits expanded as did debt but at a slower 
pace.  Brazil was not as hard hit as Argentina by the sudden stop and was able to continue 
borrowing in Europe sufficiently to service its debts ( Adelet and Eichengreen 2005). The 
situation in Brazil deteriorated when coffee prices collapsed in 1893. A current account 
reversal ensued and Brazil suffered triple banking currency and debt crises in 1897 -98. 
Output losses were comparable to those in Argentina and the output collapse like in 
Argentina ended   after two years. Like Argentina the debt crisis was resolved by 
securing a bridge loan from London to service its debt and by postponing payments on 
principal for 13 years (Adelet and Eichengreen 2005). 
 
Like Argentina Brazil was also exposed to liability dollarization, like Argentina its share 
of gold debt in total debt was above 60%. Also like Argentina it converted its 5% paper 
bonds to 4% gold bonds in 1890 ( Bordo and Meissner 2006b). 
 
Australia in the late 1880s like the others enjoyed a massive land boom to expand its 
wool producing capacity. It was financed by portfolio loans from London and by the 
extension of bank credit. Like the others the state governments engaged in bond financed 
expenditure. The Baring crisis led to a virtual cessation of British capital. This resulted in 
short order in a major current account reversal and a banking crisis in 1893. According to 
Adelet and Eichengreen (2005) both debt and currency crises were avoided because of 
Australia’s membership in the British empire. Without the safety valve of depreciation or 
of temporary debt suspension the state governments had to raise taxes and the burden of 
adjustment fell onto the domestic economy. In contrast to the two Latin countries, output 
contracted for four years by a total of 25 %. 
 
Australia’s gold debt was close to 100% of its total debt yet the presence of original sin     18 
did not seem to be a factor in its experience during this episode. The presence of a more 
stable financial system and other institutional features protected it from the type of 
financial meltdowns of the Latin countries. 
  
 Several other countries experienced the 1890s sudden stop with serious disruption as in 
the case of the three countries mentioned above. Most prominent is the case of Italy 
which had a sizeable decline in output and suffered banking crises in 1891 and 1893 and 
a currency crisis in 1889. Several countries also escaped almost unscathed including 
Canada, Norway, Sweden and the United States. These countries had sound fiscal and 
monetary institutions. The US however had a serious banking crisis in 1893 and a run on 
the dollar in the same year reflecting investors fears that the issue of silver coins 
following the Sherman Silver purchase Act of 1890 would force the US off the gold 
standard. 
 
5.The Role of Institutions :original sin and currency mismatch 
 
The pattern we observed in the pre 1914 period, which presages that found for the recent 
experience of some countries harder hit by others when sudden stops occur leads to the 
issue of identifying the key factors at work. As mentioned above, some of the literature 
identifies structural factors such as the degree of openness and institutional parameters, 
especially the degree of liability dollarization. Others see the problem as more basic, as 
related to the degree of country trust and currency trust. In this section we focus on the 
role of original sin and the extent of currency mismatches as factors that may explain the 
likelihood that countries could be hit by financial crises. 
 
All countries before 1914 except the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands had 
some or all of their external debt denominated in terms of the currencies of the core 
countries and or had gold clauses( Bordo and Flandreau 2003, Flandreau and Sussman 
2005). Most of these countries also had gold clauses on their domestic debt. In other 
words they had what Eichengreen and Haussman (1999) dubbed “ original sin” which in 
the pre 1914 period we define as the share of hard currency debt in total debt.
5  
See figure 16. In the recent era of globalization since 1973 most emergers and even some 
small advanced countries have original sin as measured by Eichengreen ,Haussman and 
Panizza ( 2003) . See figure 17. 
 
                                                 
5 Original sin based on national debt is a narrower concept than liability dollarization which involves the 
balance sheet of the private as well as the public sector. Bordo, Meissner, and Redish ( 2005) present 
evidence for the U.S. showing that gold clauses prevailed for state and corporate bonds  as well as federal 
government debt from the early nineteenth century until 1933. Further research is needed  for other 





































































































Notes: Data come from Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2005)
Source: Bordo and Meissner (2006a)
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 In addition to the extent of original sin as a possible determinant of vulnerability to 
crises, currency mismatch or the extent to which outstanding hard currency liabilities are 
backed by hard currency assets may be the main potential problem with foreign currency 
debt( Goldstein and Turner 2004).  
 
Bordo and Meissner ( 2006a and 2006b) deal with these issues . They ascertain the extent 
to which original sin and currency mismatch increased the probability of  countries 
experiencing debt, currency and banking crises , accounting for the influence of other  
fundamental determinants of crises,  in the 1880-1914 era  and as a comparison in the 
1972 to 1997 period. 
 
 For the 1880 to 1914 period there appears to be an inverse U relationship between debt 
crises and original sin. See figure 18 which shows a scatter plot of the percentage of the 
sample period a country was in crisis versus our measure of original sin. Countries with 
intermediate levels of original sin seem to take longer to resolve their debt crises than 
those at either end of the spectrum. For the recent period no such pattern is evident. In 
fact there appears to be a direct positive relationship between the severity of debt crises 
and the average level of original sin but still there is a much larger variance in experience 
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Notes: Crisis frequencies are calculated by dividing the number of years in which a country experienced a crisis by 
the total sample years. Both numerator and denominator exclude years of ongoing crisis. However, the debt crises 
series is calculated as the percentage of the period spent without a resolution of a debt default 
Figure 18 
Crisis Frequencies By Country versus the Average Level of Hard Currency Public 
Debt to Total Public Debt, 1880-1913
Source: Bordo and Meissner (2006a)
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Note: Crisis frequencies are calculated by dividing the number of years in which a country experienced a crisis by the total sample years. Both numerator and 
denominator exclude years of ongoing crisis. However, alternative debt crises is the percentage of the period spent without a resolution of a debt default. 
Figure 19




We used pooled probit specifications to econometrically evaluate the impact of original 
sin and currency mismatches on the probability of debt, currency and banking crises. .The 
regressions (not shown) include our measure of original sin in the first period and the 
Eichengreen  Haussman Panizza measure in the second. We measure currency mismatch 
in the first period by the difference between total hard currency debt outstanding less 
international reserves scaled by exports. For the recent period we use total external debt .  
As other determinants of crises we use debt to GDP, growth in the terms of trade ,the 
trade balance divided by nominal GDP, the domestic long term interest rate , an indicator 
for whether the  country maintained the gold standard ( or a pegged exchange rate today) 
, growth in the money supply , and the yield on British long term bonds pre 1914 ( the 
unweighted  average of G-7 long term bonds today). 
 
Our basic finding is that original sin does contribute to crises, especially debt crises in the 
earlier era of globalization but that currency mismatch is a  much more robust 
determinant  especially in the recent period. In our regressions for debt crises in the pre 
1914 period we see an inverse U pattern for original sin and also for the currency 
mismatch term. Figure 20 presents the predicted probabilities of a debt crisis for   the 
ratio of hard currency debt to total debt.  The predicted probability of having a debt crisis 
peaks at an original sin level of 50 per cent. Also having a banking crisis in the previous 
year and a currency crisis in the same year greatly increases the predicted probability of 
having a debt crisis. 
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Source: Bordo and Meissner (2006a)
Figure 20






















Notes: Figures are calculated based on the model in column 1 of Table 1 in Bordo and 
Meissner (2006a). The probabilities are evaluated at the sample means of the control 
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For the recent period a currency mismatch significantly increases the probability of a debt 
crisis .We also find that per capita GDP interacts with original sin to affect crisis 
outcomes. Indeed we see that middle income countries (today’s emergers) are most likely 
to have a crisis when other control variables are held constant .See figure 21. 
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Source: Bordo and Meissner (2006a)
Figure 21
Predicted Probabilities of a Debt Crisis, 1972-1997.
 
 
Notes: Figures are calculated based on the model in column 3 of Table 2 in Bordo and 
Meissner (2006a). The probabilities are evaluated at the sample means of the control 
variables with the exception of the currency crisis indicator which is zero or one and 
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Our regressions for currency crises show   a similar quadratic pattern for original sin as 
was the case for debt crises. Our results of a positive coefficient for the mismatch 
variable also suggest that although original sin is dangerous that countries that have it 
may be able to avoid currency crises if they have adequate reserves or are sufficiently 
open. For the recent period we also find that countries that can reduce the mismatch can 
help alleviate currency crises and since currency crises were found to be a determinant of 
debt crises, low mismatch has the indirect effect of helping to avoid debt crises too. 
 
For banking crises we found that for both eras that banking crises are associated with 
original sin and currency mismatches and that the quadratic pattern is apparent in the 
earlier period.. However for the recent period we also found that a marginal increase in 
original sin has a smaller impact on banking crises at higher levels of real GDP per 
capita. The predicted probability drops by more than a third when moving from a per 
capita income level of slightly less than $3000 like Mexico or Brazil in 1995 to a level of 
income of $ 22000 like Denmark or Canada. 
  
Thus our research for the first era of globalization indicates an inverse U shaped pattern 
between debt crises and original sin. More original sin is associated with a higher 
likelihood of a debt crisis up to a point , and then countries with levels of original sin 
greater 50 to 60 percent face a lower likelihood of a crisis. The inverse U shape suggests 
a division of countries into three groups. The first group includes the financial centers of 
Europe with low or no original sin and few crises. The second group includes the 
periphery countries of the Latin American cone and the Mediterranean region of Europe 
with their episodes of fiscal profligacy ( Greece and Portugal) and periods of instability in   24 
their banking systems( e.g. Argentina with its new banking laws of the 1880s and Italy 
prior to the financial sector restructuring that took place in the 1890s).Countries in the 
third group possessed stable institutions, but also strong  and flexible financial systems 
usually able to cope with crises as they emerged ( e.g, the U.S., Japan, Denmark, and 
Sweden) or intricate correspondent banking relationships and colonial ties ( e.g. 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand). 
 
For the recent period we find that the countries with mid-level GDP per capita have the 
highest probabilities of a financial crisis. This also leads us to suggest that countries 
today can be broken into three categories when original sin is high. First , we have the 
poorest countries of the world ( e.g., Colombia, Nigeria and Pakistan) which despite 
having original sin , rely relatively less on external finance . Next the middle income 
emerging market countries ( e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Korea,  Mexico, and Taiwan) which 
rely on external financing are the ones that are most at risk of seeing their hard currency 
liabilities interact with currency crashes leading to debt default episode. Then , there are 
the highly developed countries ( e.g., Belgium,Canada, Denmark, Norway, Spain, and 
Sweden) which also have high liability dollarization. Nevertheless, either external 
financing is less significant or they have ways to deal with shocks to the financial system 
we have not controlled for and hence to avoid crises. Finally countries with low original 
sin and high development are placed in a fourth category . 
 
 This pattern can be illustrated by a “radar” graph in figure 22 which plots variables of 
interest on each radiating axis  and the lines connecting the particular values represent the 
different groups of countries. The countries are divided into four groups based on per 
capita real GDP and levels of original sin. The first are those with GDP per capita lower 
than $ 2900 where the level of original sin between 1993 and 1997  was 0.99 percent. 
The second group are those countries with GDP per capita  between $2900 and $ 8100 
with an average level of 0.76, and finally two groups, one with GDP above $8100 and 
original sin level of 0.20  and the other with original sin less than  0.20. 
The variables of interest were the average trade deficit within each group, the average 
time spent without final resolution of a debt crisis, the average predicted probability of a 
debt crisis( based on a model in column 3 table 2 of (Bordo and Meissner 2006a)  and the 
median predicted probability of a debt crisis from the same model,  and the mismatch 
variable. 
   25 
Source: Bordo and Meissner (2006a)
Figure 22
“Radar” Chart Showing the Four-Part Categorization of Countries, 1972-1997.  
   
 
Notes: The figure shows four bands of countries. They are divided on their GDP 
measures. The first category being all country year observations where real GDP per 
capita is less than $2,900. Low OS means an observation’s average original sin was 
less than or equal to 20 percent. High original sin implies a measure of greater than 20 
percent. All measures on each axis are on the same scale.  Predicted and actual 
probabilities  are based on the 0 to 100 scale. The predicted probabilities come from 
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As can be seen, the richest countries are lowest on all five dimensions. The middle 
income , emerging market are highest on virtually every dimension. It would also appear 
that many of the world’s richest countries  have significant original sin and still have a 
low chance of a debt crisis. Moreover the figure shows that rich countries with high 
original sin and low crisis frequency run bigger trade surpluses or lower deficits  and also 
control their mismatch positions much better than the middle income countries, making 
them even less prone to crisis episodes. 
 
 
6. The Lessons from History. 
 
 
The emerging market countries of a century ago were vulnerable to externally driven 
sudden stops created financial crises just as they are today. It is part of the landscape of 
financial globalization. However external shocks are not the only reason why countries 
face crises. History is replete with cases of countries which suffer banking currency and 
debt crises because they followed unsound policies .( Kindleberger 1990 , Bordo 1990, 
Bordo and Schwartz 1996). 
 
However , in the face of a general sudden stop, the list of which countries were hit hard 
and which countries emerged unscathed  may be related to similar sorts of factors in both 
eras of globalization. The forces at work include: economic structure e.g the degree of 
openness and the extent to which a country has diversified production: the degree of 
liability dollarization or original sin and the monetary and fiscal policies followed.   26 
 
The lesson from the long run appears to be that sound debt management and the 
development of sound fiscal and financial capacity will allow countries to escape 
financial turmoil. But Bordo and Meissner ( 2006a, 2006b) also find evidence that 
backing hard currency debt with foreign reserves and having a large export sector for a 
given level of hard currency debt helps decrease the incidence of debt , currency and 
banking crises. Mismatches matter. So even if countries have not yet developed the 
foundations of good finances, they can minimize the risks of choppy financial waters by 
limiting their mismatch position. Nevertheless , history shows that in the face of hard 
currency debt, low mismatch is no substitute for the development of sound monetary , 
fiscal and financial policies and institutions. 
 
Indeed what emerging countries really need to do to protect themselves from sudden 
stops and crises is to grow up and become an advanced country. To be more exact todays  
emergers should learn from the experience of countries that were the emergers of  a 
century ago  and are now advanced. As Caballero et al( 2004) so well explained it, they 
need to develop country trust and currency trust. 
 
Country trust is based on sound institutions based on the deep fundamentals of the rule of 
law and stable political system. As they demonstrate from their history of Australia’s 
progression in the past century,(a story that could be repeated for Canada and the 
Scandanavian countries and which follows from the financial development of the 
Netherlands, Great Britain and the U.S. , Sylla  and Rousseau 2001), what is required is 
the development of a domestic bond market, in turn based on a broad based and efficient 
tax regime, combined with a sound banking system .These are the  key elements to the 




Currency trust is based on the ability to adhere to a credible nominal anchor. Adherence 
to the gold standard in the nineteenth century was an early example of such a regime ( 
Bordo and Kydland 1996). Adherence to gold required following stable monetary policy 
and fiscal balance.  Similar principles prevail today in a world of fiat money although the 
credible nominal anchor in advanced countries is no longer the gold standard but 
independent central banks and a commitment to maintain low inflation. 
  
In the absence of graduation to advanced country status what does history teach us  about 
protection  from sudden stops and the avoidance of crises? As mentioned above holding 
large gold reserves then ( international reserves now) and having robust export capacity 
sufficient to service hard currency debt helps. Also as Caballero et al ( 2004) point out 
being able to hedge currency risk with derivatives is important but that in turn requires a 
minimum of country and currency risk. 
 
History also tells us that countries that faced crises in the past were sometimes aided by 
international rescues but this was primarily the case for the advanced countries of 
Western Europe  ( Bordo and Schwartz 1999). For the rest, holding sufficiently large gold   27 
reserves to adhere to the gold standard was the price to pay for some degree of safety ( 
Bordo and Flandreau 2003) although Australia’s experience in the 1890s  suggests that 
did not work very well. Today is a different ballgame with the IMF in place but that is the 
subject of another paper. 
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Appendix Figure 2  29 
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Source: Catao (2006) , Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, Martinez-Peria, (2001) 
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